Over the past 60 years, a voluminous literature has painstakingly developed theories and associated candidate regressors to motivate Early Warning Signals of economic crises. The hallmark of this literature is the remarkable consistency with which selected Early Warning Signals are thought to predict different types of crises across countries and time. The diversity of theories motivating Early Warning Signals presents a challenge to empirical implementations. If the true model of Early Warning Signals is unknown, omitted variable bias contaminates estimates and model uncertainty inflates confidence levels since the uncertainty surrounding a particular theory has not been ignored. Addressing model uncertainty in Early Warning Signal regressions, we find no single Early Warning Signal that can successfully alert to all dimensions of the 2008 crisis. Instead, different types of crises are identified by economically meaningful but distinctly different sets of Early Warning Signals. The paper discusses the relevance of identified Early Warning Signals associated with four different types of crises (Banking, Balance of Payments, Exchange Rate Pressure, and Recessions). ____________________ * We thank George Saravelos for sharing his data and Jeff Frankel and Ayhan Kose for discussions. The views expressed in this study are the sole responsibility of the authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board, or its management. Eicher thanks the Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas, and the Department of Economics at the University of Costa Rica for their hospitality during the preparation of the paper. 1
Introduction
Over the past 60 years, a voluminous literature established a set of Early Warning Signals to alert countries of impending economic crises. The hallmark of this literature is the remarkable robustness of select Early Warning Signals across time, countries, and types of crises. 1 Frankel and Saravelos (2011) provide a survey of 83 studies and report that currency reserves and exchange rate overvaluations are such useful Early Warning
Signals that "the consistency of these results is impressive." The consistency is indeed remarkable as these Early Warning Signals are thought to be robust across different country subsamples (developed, emerging, and developing), time periods (1950s-2011s), and crises types (banking, currency, debt, equity, and inflation).
The remarkable robustness and consensus of the Early Warning Signals literature is surprising since dozens of alternative crisis theories have been proposed to motivate a vast number of potential signals. Statisticians refer to the uncertainty surrounding the validity of a particular theory as model uncertainty. Raftery (1995) shows that model uncertainty inflates confidence levels when the uncertainty surrounding a theory's validity has been ignored. Leamer (1978) and Raftery (1988) develop the appropriate statistical framework, Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), to address model uncertainty as part of the statistical methodology. BMA can then be applied to simultaneously evaluate the validity of alternative theories and their associated candidate regressors.
In this paper we apply BMA to a prominent and comprehensive crisis dataset, which features the greatest coverage of countries and regressors to date. We employ the approach to examine the robustness of consensus Early Warning Signals, using the yardstick of the 2008 crisis. Aside from the interest for policy makers, there are a number of reasons why the 2008 crisis is particularly well suited to assess the validity of consensus Early Warning Signals. First, the magnitude of the crisis should evoke strong predictive power for any valid Early Warning Signal. Second, the crisis has been uniquely broad and synchronized across the global economy. This provides a unique test whether Early Warning Signals exist that alert for different or all subsets of countries and crises.
Early studies do not produce evidence that conventional Early Warning Signals managed to predict the 2008 crisis. Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009a,b) find that reserves/M2 predicted depreciations, but established Early Warning Signals were shown to be statistically insignificant. Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b) , and also Blanchard et al. (2009) The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the BMA methodology and justifies its application, Section 3 motivates each Early Warning Signal employed in our analysis in terms of prior use and theory motivation, Section 4 provides the data sources, and Section 5 presents results and assessments that are relevant for policy makers in light of the past literature.
Uncovering Early Warning Signals Using Bayesian Model Averaging
Previous methodological approaches to assessing Early Warning Signals are dominated by researcher selected regression specifications that can be grouped into four categories (see Abiad, 2003; Hawkins and Klaw, 2000; Collins, 2003; and Frankel and Saravelos, 2011) . One approach uses probit/logit techniques when crisis dedicators involve incidence thresholds (first popularized by Eichengreen, Rose and Wypslosz, 1995) .
Alternatively, non-parametric signaling approaches are used to identify crises via threshold values for sets of hand-picked Early Warning Signals (first popularized by Kaminski, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998) . A third approach is to split the sample into researcher-selected crisis and non-crisis countries (see Kamin, 1988) .
Recent approaches use alternative statistical methods to identify thresholds for Early Warning Signals, via regression trees (Ghosh and Ghosh, 2002) , artificial neural or genetic algorithms (Nag and Mitra, 1999) , and Markov switching models (Cerra and Saxena, 2001 ). None of these approaches consider, however, that either the researchersspecified set of regressions or the researcher-selected regression trees examine only models that arise from theories whose validities are uncertain. The second limitation of previous statistical methodologies is the lack of a clear selection criterion to identify robust Early Warning Signals. Some studies identify valid Early Warning Signals as those regressors that are significant in at least one of their regressions (e.g., Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998) , while others identify valid Early Warning Signals as those that are significant in the majority of regressions (e.g., Frankel and Saravelos, 2011) .
In this section we briefly sketch the basic ideas of Bayesian Model Averaging, BMA, following the exposition in Eicher, Papageorgiou and Raftery (2011) . For a complete survey of BMA approaches, see Raftery, Madigan and Hoeting (1997 
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The integrated likelihood is the crucial ingredient in deriving each model's weight in the model averaging process. We denote by ) ( k M pr the prior probability that k M is the correct model, given that one of the models considered is the true model. Then, by
Bayes's theorem, the posterior model probability of
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The posterior mean and variance of a regression coefficient, j  , are then given by (Raftery, 1993) . In addition to the posterior means and standard deviations, BMA provides the posterior inclusion probability of a candidate regressor,
, by summing the posterior model probabilities across those models that include the regressor. Posterior inclusion probabilities provide a probability statement regarding the importance of a regressor that directly addresses what is often the researcher's prime concern: "what is the probability that the regressor has an effect on the dependent variable?" The general rule developed by Jeffreys (1961) and refined by Kass and Raftery (1995) stipulates effectthresholds for posterior inclusion probabilities. Posterior inclusion probabilities < 50% are seen as evidence against an effect, and the evidence for an effect is either weak, positive, strong, or decisive for posterior inclusion probabilities ranging from 50-75%, 75-95%, 95-99%, and > 99%, respectively. In our analysis, we refer to a regressor as "effective," if its posterior inclusion probability exceeds 50%.
Since BMA averages over all models considered, the model space may be a very large quantity. For example, in this paper we consider a crisis dataset with 57 regressors which implies 2 57 candidate models. Such a vast model space poses a computational challenge such that direct evaluation is typically not feasible. 
Dimensions of Crises and Early Warning Signal Candidate Regressors

The Early Warning Signal Dataset
The dataset used in our estimation is an updated and modified version of the Frankel and Saravelos' (2011) 
Dimensions of the Crises
The Early Warning Signal literature commonly features a narrow set of dependent variables that are employed to identify the intensity, incidence, and economic dimension of a crisis. Balance of payment crises are usually proxied with a dummy that indicates whether an IMF facility was accessed. Alternatively, variations in nominal or real exchange rates against the US dollar or SDR are used, 2 and more general measures include exchange market pressure indices which combine exchange rates, reserves, and/or interest rates. 3 Banking crises have been identified using a range of regressors that reflect the health of the financial system, such as liquidity or leverage ratios.
4 2 E.g., Edwards (1989); Frankel and Rose (1996) ; Bruggemann and Linne (1999); Osband and Rijckeghem (2000) , Goldfajn and Valdes (1998) ; Esquivel and Larrain (1998); Apoteker and Barthelemy (2000) , Rose and Spiegel (2009a, b) . 3 E.g., Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996a,b); Corsetti, et al. (1998) ; Fratzcher (1998); Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998); Berg and Pattillo (1999a, b); Tornell (1999) ; Mulder (1999, 2000) ; Collins (2003); and Frankel and Wei (2005) focus on continuous measures that produce results that are insensitive to particular researcher-specified crisis-threshold definitions.
Candidate Regressors for Early Warning Signals
The theoretical and empirical literature on economic crises has been succinctly summarized by Frankel and Saravelos (2011) The credit growth could also result in the need to finance excessive fiscal deficits or debt imbalances. Extensions of Krugman's framework suggest that unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies can also lead to excessive demand for traded goods, causing deteriorations in the trade balance and real appreciations to foreshadow balance of payments crises.
5 E.g., Ghosh and Ghosh (2002) , and Grier and Grier (2001) . 6 E.g., Frankel and Rose (1996) define "currency crashes" as a 20% nominal exchange rate depreciation that also exceeds the previous year's depreciation by least 10%; while Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) , define "exchange market crises" as two standard deviation movements of a speculative pressure index.
To capture such factors, our dataset includes 20 detailed balance of payments 
Empirical Support for Early Warning Signals
We (1995) , the index is a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve changes, where the weights are the inverse of the relative standard deviation of each series to compensate for differences in volatilities. Our BMA results are presented in Table 1 .
Early Warning Signals for Balance of Payments Crises
The incidence of balance of payment crises is proxied by country access to IMF programs. This measure indicates not only the incidence of a crisis, but also whether a country requested access and received IMF approval. The advantage of this indicator is that it measures balance of payment crises narrowly, since IMF Articles of Agreement require justification only in terms of adverse developments in the balance of payments.
Strictly speaking, a country facing a pure debt or banking crisis should not access IMF financing. Since there exist potentially significant time lags between crisis incidence and IMF program approval, we included all programs approved through 2011. Coverage of the global sample is important for this indicator, since the recent crisis produced programs for advanced countries that had not accessed IMF credit for decades.
BMA identifies three Early Warning Signals for balance of payments crisis: high inflation, low reserves, and trade deficits are shown to predict the incidence of IMF programs during the 2008 crisis. All of these are key variables of macroeconomic imbalances and external weakness that tend to be a focus of IMF programs, so their presence is not surprising. Surprising is perhaps how parsimonious the regressors are that predict balance of payment crises.
Early Warning Signals of Recessions
The regressions linking real GDP contractions to Early Warning Signals clearly highlight that the most dramatic output contractions occurred in high income countries. BMA
indicates that high income countries were more likely to have more dramatic output contractions. Crucial in determining the magnitude of the recessions was also the size of the current account deficit in 2007, as well as the change in the current account surplus in the previous 5 years. The former is easier to interpret than the latter. Large trade deficits are difficult to finance in times of illiquid international credit, which could lead to recessions. BMA also indicates, however, that countries which experienced greater improvements in their current accounts in the previous 5 years were also more likely to experience larger recessions. The explanation here could be that the trade credit collapse exerted a greater impact on countries that had recently relied relatively more heavily on export growth in the recent past.
Along with the external balance, the rise in domestic credit in the 5 years preceding the crisis is also identified as a crucial determinant of the magnitude of recessions. The results suggest that a greater run up in credit generates more severe recessions. Marginally important regressors are inflation and reserves. Higher inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator) and a reduction in the level of reserves are shown to exert a weak effect on predicting recessions. Curiously, we also find that countries that increased reserves more dramatically during the crisis experienced sharper recessions.
This may indicate that some countries' austerity measures, designed to protect or even increase FX reserves, may have led to larger recessions along the lines of Keynes paradox of thrift. Note that thus far there is zero overlap between determinants of recessions or IMF programs, suggesting little hope of finding a "robust" Early Warning
Signal, one that predicts all different types of economic crises.
Early Warning Signals of Exchange Rate Crises
The exchange rate crisis indicator was constructed by Frankel and Saravelos (2011) for August 2008 to March 2009 following the Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) methodology. To capture crises in both fixed and flexible regimes and taking into account that IMF programs provide reserves in times of crisis, the FX pressure index measures the weighted average of the change in the exchange rate and reserves. The weights are determined by (the inverse) relative standard deviations of each series in order to compensate for differences in volatilities. A higher index captures a lower crisis incidence, since it indicates a stronger exchange rate and/or larger reserve accumulations.
As expected, a number of candidate regressors straightforwardly related to the external sector have strong influence on FX pressure. A depreciating real effective exchange rate (measured over the prior 5 years), lower remittances, and larger trade deficits all increase FX pressure. More interesting is the finding that lower bank liquidityto-asset ratios also increase FX pressure, as do lower levels of domestic credit. Of secondary importance, exerting weak to moderate effects on FX pressure, are higher rates of inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator) and per capita GDP. The latter indicates once again that richer countries were those primarily impacted by the FX crisis. Note that again, with the exception of the GDP deflator, none of the Early Warning Signals that predict FX pressure overlaps with Early Warning Signals that predict other dimensions of crises.
Early Warning Signals of Banking Crises
Certainly countries that relied heavily on goods exports also were at greater risk of banking crises, while relatively larger service exports as a per cent of GDP insulated countries from banking crises. Not surprisingly, lack of financial openness is also associated with a greater risk of a banking crisis.
One initially puzzling result from the BMA estimation suggests that higher rates of inflation in the 5 years prior to 2008 are associated with "lower risk" of banking crisis, in the sense that higher inflation produced higher liquidity to asset ratios. This may be an artifact of basic banking principles, where higher rates of inflation reduce incentives to lend, leading to a relative reduction of illiquid assets, which artificially inflates the ratio of liquid to non liquid assets. With fewer funds committed to rather illiquid investments, to minimize the impact of high inflation, banks are better prepared for liquidity crises.
Conclusion
To establish a direct comparison to the previous literature, we employ an identical set of Early Warning Signals that had been suggested by Frankel and Saravelos (2011) .
Indeed we utilize the same dataset with two important modifications. First, we update the dataset taking into account national, World Bank, and IMF data revisions. Second, we construct a balanced dataset where each regression covers the same sample of countries.
The updated dataset is then utilized using Bayesian Model Averaging to address missing and omitted variable bias and address model uncertainty as part of the empirical strategy. All regressors from Appendix Table 1 are included the investigation of each crisis determinant. We only report results for candidate regressors whose inclusion probability exceeds 2.5 percent. Banking Crisis does not include the liquidity to asset ratio as a regressor and the real GDP growth runs do not include regressors related to GDP. 
Appendix
